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Abstract
I review some recent work on applications of category theory to questions concerning theo-
retical structure and theoretical equivalence of classical field theories, including Newtonian
gravitation, general relativity, and Yang-Mills theories.
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1. Introduction
There are certain questions that arise in philosophy of science—including the philosophies
of particular sciences—for which it would be useful to have a formal apparatus by which to
represent a scientific theory abstractly.1 To this end, in the context of a sustained critique of
the so-called “semantic view” of theories, Halvorson (2012) has suggested that philosophers
look to category theory for tools and inspiration. The proposal is that for some purposes,
it is useful to think of a scientific theory as a collection of (mathematical) models—though
not, as in the semantic view, a bare set of models, but rather as a structured set of models,
or more specifically, a category of models.2
Email address: weatherj@uci.edu (James Owen Weatherall)
1Of course, there is a long history of proposals aiming to do just this, beginning with Carnap (1968 [1928]),
Russell (2007 [1927]), and Ramsey (1931). For overviews of this history and the current state of the field,
see Lutz (2015) and Halvorson (2015b), and references therein.
2In some cases, one might also consider topological structure (Fletcher, 2015), measure theoretic structure
(Curiel, 2014), etc. The idea of using category theory to compare physical theories traces back to Mac Lane
(1968), who suggested that the Legendre transform between Hamilton and Lagrangian mechanics may be
understood as a natural transformation—a result connected with recent work on the structure of classical
mechanics (North, 2009; Curiel, 2013; Barrett, 2014a). See also Lawvere and Schanuel (1986).
Draft of January 26, 2016 PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE!
Although the present chapter develops this idea, I do not defend it.3 Instead, my goal
is to show how the idea can be put to work, by reviewing how it has been fruitfully applied
to a cluster of related issues concerning symmetry, structure, and equivalence in the context
of classical (i.e., non-quantum) field theories. Contemporary interest in these issues can be
traced back to Stein (1967) and Earman (1989b), who showed how 17th century debates
concerning substantivalism and relationism in Newtonian gravitation can (and should) be
understood to be about whether a classical spacetime is endowed with certain geometrical
structure.4 Meanwhile, Earman and Norton (1987) and Stachel (1989) have argued that
the infamous “hole argument” leads to puzzles about the structure of spacetime in general
relativity.5 Recent debates concerning interpretations of Yang-Mills theory, and so-called
“gauge theories” more generally, may be understood along similar lines (Belot, 1998, 2003;
Healey, 2001, 2004, 2007; Arntzenius, 2012).6
I will begin by introducing the category theory that will appear in the sequel. Then I will
show how this framework re-captures (old) intuitions about relative amounts of structure
in classical spacetime theories. This discussion will lead to classical electromagnetism and
a discussion of “gauge” structure. Finally, I will consider more difficult issues arising in
general relativity and Yang-Mills theory. In these last two cases, I will argue, the tools
developed in the earlier parts of the paper provide new traction on thorny interpretational
issues of current interest.7
3A more direct defense can be found in Halvorson (2015a, this volume). Still, I take what follows to
have some probative value: in my view, fruitful application of the sort described here is the most compelling
reason to develop a formal program in philosophy of science.
4This particular thread continues: recently, Saunders (2013), Knox (2014), and Weatherall (2015c) have
considered new arguments concerning just what structure is presupposed by Newton’s Principia.
5For up-to-date overviews of the state of the art on the hole argument, see Pooley (2013) and Norton
(2011).
6These issues also connect up with more general concerns in philosophy of science and metaphysics,
concerning (1) the role of symmetry in guiding our attempts to extract metaphysical morals from our
scientific (read: physical!) theories (Ismael and van Fraassen, 2003; Baker, 2010; Dasgupta, 2015) and (2)
the relationship between the structural features of our theories and various forms of realism (Worrall, 1989;
Ladyman and Ross, 2009; French, 2014).
7The material presented here draws on a number of recent papers by the author and collabora-
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Before proceeding, let me flag a worry. Although some of the results I describe in the
body of the paper are non-trivial, the category theory I use is elementary and, arguably,
appears only superficially. Meanwhile, there are areas of mathematics and mathematical
physics closely related to the theories I discuss—synthetic differential geometry; higher gauge
theory—where category theory plays a much deeper role.8 But as I said above, my goal is
to review some ways in which thinking of a physical theory as a category of models bears
fruit for issues of antecedent philosophical interest. The role the category theory ends up
playing is to regiment the discussion, providing the mathematical apparatus needed to make
questions of theoretical structure and equivalence precise enough to settle. The fact that
fairly simple ideas bear low-hanging fruit only provides further motivation for climbing into
the higher branches.
2. Structure and Equivalence in Category Theory
There are many cases in which we want to say that one kind of mathematical object has
more structure than another kind of mathematical object.9 For instance, a topological space
has more structure than a set. A Lie group has more structure than a smooth manifold. A
ring has more structure than a group. And so on. In each of these cases, there is a sense
in which the first sort of object—say, a topological space—results by taking an instance
of the second sort—say, a set—and adding something more—in this case, a topology. In
other cases, we want to say that two different kinds of mathematical object have the same
amount of structure. For instance, given a Boolean algebra, I can construct a special kind
of topological space, known as a Stone space, from which I can uniquely reconstruct the
tors, including Weatherall (2015a), Weatherall (2015e), Weatherall (2015d), Rosenstock et al. (2015), and
Rosenstock and Weatherall (2015a,b).
8For more on synthetic differential geometry, see Kock (2006); and for applications to physics, see
Mac Lane (1968), Lawvere and Schanuel (1986) and, more recently, Reyes (2011). Higher gauge theory
is described by Baez and Schreiber (2007).
9The ideas in this section are developed in more detail by Barrett (2013).
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original Boolean algebra; and vice-versa.
These sorts of relationships between mathematical objects are naturally captured in the
language of category theory,10 via the notion of a forgetful functor. For instance, there is a
functor F : Top → Set from the category Top, whose objects are topological spaces and
whose arrows are continuous maps, to the category Set, whose objects are sets and whose
arrows are functions. This functor takes every topological space to its underlying set, and it
takes every continuous function to its underlying function. We say this functor is forgetful
because, intuitively speaking, it forgets something: namely the choice of topology on a given
set.
The idea of a forgetful functor is made precise by a classification of functors due to
Baez et al. (2004). This requires some machinery. A functor F : C → D is said to be full
if for every pair of objects A,B of C, the map F : hom(A,B)→ hom(F (A), F (B)) induced
by F is surjective, where hom(A,B) is the collection of arrows from A to B. Likewise, F is
faithful if this induced map is injective for every such pair of objects. Finally, a functor is
essentially surjective if for every object X of D, there exists some object A of C such that
F (A) is isomorphic to X .
If a functor is full, faithful, and essentially surjective, we will say that it forgets nothing.
A functor F : C→ D is full, faithful, and essentially surjective if and only if it is essentially
invertible, i.e., there exists a functor G : D → C such that G ◦ F : C → C is naturally
isomorphic to 1C, the identity functor on C, and F ◦G : D→ D is naturally isomorphic to
1D. (Note, then, that G is also essentially invertible, and thus G also forgets nothing.) This
means that for each object A of C, there is an isomorphism ηA : G ◦ F (A) → A such that
for any arrow f : A→ B in C, ηB ◦G ◦ F (f) = f ◦ ηA, and similarly for every object of D.
When two categories are related by a functor that forgets nothing, we say the categories are
10I will take for granted the basic definitions of category theory—that is, definitions of category and
functor—but no more. For these notions, see Mac Lane (1998), Leinster (2014), and other papers in this
volume.
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equivalent and that the pair F,G realizes an equivalence of categories.
Conversely, any functor that fails to be full, faithful, and essentially surjective forgets
something. But functors can forget in different ways. A functor F : C→ D forgets structure
if it is not full; properties if it is not essentially surjective; and stuff if it is not faithful. Of
course, “structure”, “property”, and “stuff” are technical terms in this context. But they
are intended to capture our intuitive ideas about what it means for one kind of object to
have more structure (resp., properties, stuff) than another. We can see this by considering
some examples.
For instance, the functor F : Top → Set described above is faithful and essentially
surjective, but not full, because not every function is continuous. So this functor forgets
only structure—which is just the verdict we expected. Likewise, there is a functor G :
AbGrp → Grp from the category AbGrp whose objects are Abelian groups and whose
arrows are group homomorphisms to the categry Grp whose objects are (arbitrary) groups
and whose arrows are group homomorphisms. This functor acts as the identity on the
objects and arrows of AbGrp. It is full and faithful, but not essentially surjective because
not every group is Abelian. So this functor forgets only properties: namely, the property of
being Abelian. Finally, consider the unique functor H : Set → 1, where 1 is the category
with one object and one arrow. This functor is full and essentially surjective, but it is not
faithful, so it forgets only stuff—namely all of the elements of the sets, since we may think of
1 as the category whose only object is the empty set, which has exactly one automorphism.
In what follows, we will say that one sort of object has more structure (resp. properties,
stuff) than another if there is a functor from the first category to the second that forgets
structure (resp. properties, stuff). It is important to note, however, that comparisons of this
sort must be relativized to a choice of functor. In many cases, there is an obvious functor to
choose—i.e., a functor that naturally captures the standard of comparison in question. But
there may be other ways of comparing mathematical objects that yield different verdicts.
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For instance, there is a natural sense in which groups have more structure than sets, since
any group may be thought of as a set of elements with some additional structure. This
relationship is captured by a forgetful functor F : Grp → Set that takes groups to their
underlying sets and group homomorphisms to their underlying functions. But any set also
uniquely determines a group, known as the free group generated by that set; likewise, func-
tions generate group homomorphisms between free groups. This relationship is captured by
a different functor, G : Set → Grp, that takes every set to the free group generated by it
and every function to the corresponding group homomorphism. This functor forgets both
structure (the generating set) and properties (the property of being a free group). So there
is a sense in which sets may be construed to have more structure than groups.
3. Classical Spacetime Structure
To get a feel for how to apply these ideas to issues in philosophy of physics, I will begin
by translating some well-understood examples into the present terms. In particular, John
Earman (1989b, Ch. 2), building on Stein (1967) and others, characterizes several classical
spacetime structures that have been of interest historically. To focus on just two of the
most important (the present discussion is easily extended), Galilean spacetime consists in
a quadruple (M, ta, h
ab,∇), where M is the manifold R4;11 ta is a one form on M ; h
ab is a
smooth, symmetric tensor field of signature (0, 1, 1, 1), and ∇ is a flat covariant derivative
operator. We require that ta and h
ab be compatible in the sense that tah
ab = 0 at every
point, and that ∇ be compatible with both tensor fields, in the sense that ∇atb = 0 and
∇ah
bc = 0.
The points of M represent events in space and time. The field ta is a “temporal metric”,
11More generally, the manifolds I consider throughout the chapter are smooth, Hausdorff, paracompact,
and connected. All fields defined on these manifolds are likewise assumed to be smooth, unless I indicate
otherwise. I work in the abstract index notation, as developed by Penrose and Rindler (1984). For further
details on classical spacetime structure, see Malament (2012, Ch. 4).
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assigning a “temporal length” |taξ
a| to vectors ξa at a point p ∈ M . Since R4 is simply
connected, ∇atb = 0 implies that there exists a smooth function t : M → R such that
ta = ∇at. We may thus define a foliation of M into constant-t hypersurfaces representing
collections of simultaneous events—i.e., space at a time. We assume that each of these
surfaces is diffeomorphic to R3 and that hab restricted these surfaces is (the inverse of) a
flat, Euclidean, and complete metric. In this sense, hab may be thought of as a spatial metric,
assigning lengths to spacelike vectors, all of which are tangent to some spatial hypersurface.
We represent particles propagating through space over time by smooth curves whose tangent
vector ξa, called the 4-velocity of the particle, satisfies ξata = 1 along the curve. The
derivative operator ∇ then provides a standard of acceleration for particles, which is given
by ξn∇nξ
a. Thus, in Galilean spacetime we have notions of objective duration between
events; objective spatial distance between simultaneous events; and objective acceleration
of particles moving through space over time.
However, Galilean spacetime does not support an objective notion of the (spatial) ve-
locity of a particle. To get this, we move to Newtonian spacetime, which is a quintuple
(M, ta, h
ab,∇, ηa). The first four elements are precisely as in Galilean spacetime, with the
same assumptions. The final element, ηa, is a smooth vector field satisfying ηata = 1 and
∇aη
b = 0. This field represents a state of absolute rest at every point—i.e., it represents
“absolute space”. This field allows one to define absolute velocity: given a particle passing
through a point p with 4-velocity ξa, the (absolute, spatial) velocity of the particle at p is
ξa − ηa.
There is a natural sense in which Newtonian spacetime has strictly more structure than
Galilean spacetime: after all, it consists of Galilean spacetime plus an additional element. As
Earman observes, this judgment may be made precise by observing that the automorphisms
of Newtonian spacetime—that is, its spacetime symmetries—form a proper subgroup of
the automorphisms of Galilean spacetime. The intuition here is that if a structure has more
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symmetries, then there must be less structure that is preserved by the maps.12 In the case of
Newtonian spacetime, these automorphisms are diffeomorphisms ϑ :M → M that preserve
ta, h
ab, ∇, and ηa. These will consist in rigid spatial rotations, spatial translations, and
temporal translations (and combinations of these). Automorphisms of Galilean spacetime,
meanwhile, will be diffeomorphisms that preserve only the metrics and derivative operator.
These include all of the automorphisms of Newtonian spacetime just described, plus Galilean
boosts.
It is this notion of “more structure” that is captured by the forgetful functor approach
described above. To recapitulate Earman, we define two categories, Gal and New, which
have Galilean and Newtonian spacetime as their (essentially unique) objects, respectively,
and have automorphisms of these spacetimes as their arrows.13 Then there is a functor
F : New → Gal that takes arrows of New to arrows of Gal generated by the same
automorphism of M . This functor is clearly essentially surjective and faithful, but it is not
full for reasons already discussed, and so it forgets only structure. Thus the criterion of
structural comparison given above perfectly recapitulates Earman’s condition—and indeed,
may be seen as a generalization of the latter to cases where one is comparing collections of
models of a theory, rather than individual spacetimes.
To see this last point more clearly, let us move to another well-trodden example. There
are two approaches to classical gravitational theory: (ordinary) Newtonian gravitation (NG)
and geometrized Newtonian gravitation (GNG), sometimes known as Newton-Cartan the-
ory. Models of NG consist of Galilean spacetime as described above, plus a scalar field ϕ,
representing a gravitational potential. This field is required to satisfy Poisson’s equation,
12This way of comparing structure is also explored by Barrett (2014b), under the name SYM*. He goes
on to argue that Minkowski spacetime (see fn. 18) also has less structure than Newtonian spacetime, but
that Galilean and Minkowski spacetimes have incomparable amounts of structure.
13For simplicity, following Baez et al. (2004), I am restricting attention to groupoids, i.e., categories with
only isomorphisms. There are several ways in which one could add arrows to the categories I discuss here
and in what follows, but nothing turns on how or whether one includes them.
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∇a∇aϕ = 4πρ, where ρ is a smooth scalar field representing the mass density on spacetime.
In the presence of a gravitational potential, massive test point particles will accelerate ac-
cording to ξn∇nξ
a = −∇aϕ, where ξa is the 4-velocity of the particle. We write models as
(M, ta, h
ab,∇, ϕ).14
The models of GNG, meanwhile, may be written as quadruples (M, ta, h
ab, ∇˜), where
we assume for simplicity that M , ta, and h
ab are all as described above, and where ∇˜
is a covariant derivative operator compatible with ta and h
ab. Now, however, we allow
∇˜ to be curved, with Ricci curvature satisfying the geometrized Poisson equation, Rab =
4πρtatb, again for some smooth scalar field ρ representing the mass density.
15 In this theory,
gravitation is not conceived as a force: even in the presence of matter, massive test point
particles traverse geodesics of ∇˜—where now these geodesics depend on the distribution of
matter, via the geometrized Poisson equation.
There is a sense in which NG and GNG are empirically equivalent: a pair of results due
to Trautman (1965) guarantee that (1) given a model of NG, there always exists a model
of GNG with the same mass distribution and the same allowed trajectories for massive test
point particles, and (2), with some further assumptions, vice versa (see Malament, 2012,
§4.2). But in a number of influential articles, Glymour (1970, 1977, 1980) has argued that
these are nonetheless inequivalent theories, because of an asymmetry in the relationship just
described. Given a model of NG, there is a unique corresponding model of GNG. But given
a model of GNG, there are typically many corresponding models of NG. Thus, it appears
that NG makes distinctions that GNG does not make (despite the empirical equivalence),
which in turn suggests that NG has more structure than GNG.
14Here and throughout, we suppress the source terms in differential equations when writing models of
a theory, since such fields can generally be defined from the other fields—so, for instance, given a model
(M, ta, h
ab,∇, ϕ) of NG, we define an associated mass density by Poisson’s equation.
15The Ricci tensor associated with a covariant derivative operator ∇ is defined by Rbc = R
a
bca, where
Rabcd, is the Riemann tensor, which is the unique tensor field such that given any point p and any smooth
vector field defined on a neighborhood of that point, Rabcdξ
b = −2∇[c∇d]ξ
a. The Riemann tensor vanishes
iff the derivative operator is flat.
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This intuition, too, may be captured using a forget functor. Define a categoryNG whose
objects are models of NG (for various mass densities) and whose arrows are automorphisms
of M that preserve ta, h
ab, ∇, and ϕ; and a category GNG whose objects are models of
GNG and whose arrows are automorphisms of M that preserve ta, h
ab, and ∇˜. Then there
is a functor F : NG → GNG that takes each model of NG to the corresponding model
given by the Trautman results, and takes each arrow to an arrow generated by the same
diffeomorphism.16 Then results in Weatherall (2015a) imply the following.
Proposition 1. F : NG→ GNG forgets only structure.
4. Excess Structure and “Gauge”
The relationship between NG and GNG captured by Prop. 1 is revealing. As noted, there
is a sense in which NG and GNG are empirically equivalent—and more, there is a sense in
which the theories are capable of representing precisely the same physical situations. And
yet, NG has more structure than GNG. This suggests that NG has more structure than
is strictly necessary to represent these situations, since after all, GNG can do the same
representational work with less structure. Theories with this character are sometimes said
to have “excess structure” and are often called gauge theories by physicists.17
The archetypal example of a gauge theory is classical electromagnetism. To be clear
about the sense in which electromagnetism has excess structure, I will present two charac-
terizations of its models. (For simplicity, I limit attention to electromagnetism in a fixed
background of Minkowski spacetime, (M, ηab)).
18 On the first formulation, which I will call
EM1, the fundamental dynamical quantity is a two form Fab, known as the Faraday tensor.
This tensor field represents the electromagnetic field at each point.19 It is required to satisfy
16That this is a functor is established in Weatherall (2015a).
17For more on the term “gauge theory”, see Weatherall (2015e).
18 Minkowski spacetime is a relativistic spacetime consisting of the manifold R4 with a flat, complete
Lorentzian metric ηab. For more on relativistic spacetimes, see section 6 and Malament (2012).
19For more on how to recover electric and magnetic fields from Fab, see Malament (2012, §2.6).
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Maxwell’s equations, which may be written as daFbc = 0 and ∇aF
ab = J b, where d is the
exterior derivative, ∇ is the Minkowski spacetime derivative operator, and J b is the charge
current density associated with any charged matter present in spacetime. On the second
formulation, EM2, the fundamental dynamical quantity is a one form, Aa, known as the
vector potential. The vector potential is required to satisfy ∇a∇
aAb = ∇b∇aA
a + J b. On
the first formulation, a model of electromagnetism may be represented as an ordered triple,
(M, ηab, Fab); on the second, a model would be a triple (M, ηab, Aa).
As with NG and GNG above, there is a close relationship between EM1 and EM2.
Given a model of EM2, (M, ηab, Aa), I can always construct a model of EM1 that satisfies
Maxwell’s equations for the same charge-current density, by defining Fab = daAb. Conversely,
given a model (M, ηab, Fab) of EM1, there always exists a suitable vector potential Aa such
that Fab = daAb. On both formulations, the empirical significance of the theory is taken
to be captured by the associated Faraday tensor—directly for models of EM1, and by the
relationship Aa 7→ daAb for EM2. And so, we have a clear sense in which the two formulations
are empirically equivalent.
These formulations of electromagnetism are analogous to NG and GNG, as follows. While
every model of EM2 gives rise to a unique model of EM1, there are typically many models
of EM2 corresponding to any given model of EM1. Once again, this appears to have the
consequence that EM2 makes distinctions that EM1 does not—and that these distinctions
between models of EM2 add nothing to the empirical success of the theory. Again, this
relationship is captured by a forgetful functor: define a category EM1 with models of EM1
as objects and isometries of Minkowski spacetime that preserve Fab as arrows; and define a
category EM2 with models of EM2 as objects, and isometries of Minkowski spacetime that
preserve Aa as arrows. We may then define a functor F : EM2 → EM1 that acts on objects
via Aa 7→ Fab = daAb, and which takes arrows to arrows generated by the same isometry.
Weatherall (2015e) then proves the following.
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Proposition 2. F : EM2 → EM1 forgets only structure.
We thus have a sense in which EM2 has more structure than EM1—and indeed, since EM1
and EM2 are taken to have the same representational capacities, it would seem that EM2
must have excess structure. This raises a question, though. If EM2 has excess structure,
why do physicists use it? The answer is purely pragmatic: vector potentials are often more
convenient to work with than Faraday tensors. Moreover, the excess structure does not
cause any problems for the theory, because physicists are well aware that it is there, and it
is easily controlled. In particular, if Aa is a vector potential, then A
′
a = Aa +∇aψ, for any
smooth scalar field ψ, will be such that daAa = daA
′
b; moreover, A
′
a will satisfy the relevant
differential equation for a given charge-current density just in case Aa does. The map that
takes Aa to A′a is an example of a gauge transformation. Vector potentials related by gauge
transformations are taken to be physically equivalent—even though they are mathematically
inequivalent, in the sense that they concern distinct fields on Minkowski spacetime.
Once we take gauge transformations into account, the two formulations are usually taken
to be equivalent ways of presenting electromagnetism. This relationship can also be captured
in the language we have been developing. In effect, that the functor F : EM2 → EM1
defined above fails to be full reflects the fact that, on the natural way of relating models of the
theories, there are arrows “missing” from EM2. The gauge transformations, meanwhile, may
be understood as additional arrows—that is, they provide a second notion of isomorphism
between models of EM2 that preserves the structure that we take to have representational
significance in physics. These arrows can be added to EM2 to define a new category, EM
′
2,
which has the same objects as EM2, but whose arrows f : (M, ηab, Aa) → (M, ηab, A
′
a) are
now pairs f = (χ,Ga), where χ :M →M is an isometry of Minkowski spacetime, Ga = ∇aψ
for some smooth scalar field ψ, and χ∗(A′a) = Aa + Ga. We may then define a new functor
F ′ : EM′2 → EM1, which has the same action on objects as F , but which acts on arrows as
12
(χ,Ga) 7→ χ.
20 Weatherall (2015a) then proves the following.
Proposition 3. F ′ : EM′2 → EM1 forgets nothing.
As Weatherall (2015a) also shows, one can identify an analogous class of gauge transfor-
mations between models of NG. These additional transformations, which reflect the fact that
Newtonian physics cannot distinguish a state of inertial motion from one of uniform linear
acceleration, have arguably been recognized as equivalences between models of Newtonian
gravitation since Newton’s Principia—indeed, one may interpret Corollary VI to the Laws of
Motion as describing precisely these transformations.21 More, one can define an alternative
category with models of NG as objects, and with these Newtonian gauge transformations
included among the arrows; this new category is then equivalent to GNG.
5. Yang-Mills Theory and Excess Structure
The discussion of gauge theories in the previous section makes precise one sense in which
electromagnetism and Newtonian gravitation have excess structure: there are textbook for-
mulations of these theories that have structure that apparently plays no role in how the
theories are used, in the sense that there are other formulations of the theories that have
the same representational capacities, but which have less structure in the sense described by
Props. 1 and 2. In many cases of interest, however, we do not have multiple formulations
to work with, and we are confronted with the question of whether a particular formulation
has excess structure without a comparison class.
It is here that the relationship between EM2 and EM
′
2 becomes especially important.
What we see in Prop. 3 is that the excess structure in EM2, as captured by Prop. 2,
may be “removed” by identifying an additional class of “gauge transformations” that relate
20That EM′2 is a category, and that F
′ is a functor, is shown in Weatherall (2015a).
21For more on the significance of Corollary VI, see DiSalle (2008), Saunders (2013), Knox (2014), and
Weatherall (2015c).
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non-isomorphic, but physically equivalent, models of the theories. This observation provides
us with an alternative criterion for identifying when a formulation of a theory has excess
structure: namely, when there are models of the theory that we believe have precisely the
same representational capacities, but which are not isomorphic to one another.22 With this
criterion in mind, I will now turn to other theories that are often called gauge theories, to
try to identify whether they have excess structure. In this section, I will consider (classical)
Yang-Mills theory; in the next section, general relativity.
Classically, a model of Yang-Mills theory consists in a principal connection ωAα on a
principal bundle G→ P
℘
−→M with structure group G, over a relativistic spacetime (M, gab)
(see section 6).23 We will write these models as (P, gab, ω
A
α). The principal bundle P may be
thought of as a bundle of frames for associated vector bundles V → P ×G V
pi
−→ M , sections
of which represent distributions of matter on space-time. The principal connection ωAα
determines a unique derivative operator on every vector bundle; this derivative operator is
the one appearing in matter dynamics, and in this way the connection affects the evolution
of matter. Conversely, every matter field is associated with a horizontal and equivariant
Lie algebra valued one form JAα on P , called the charge-current density. The principal
connection is related to the total charge-current density on P by the Yang-Mills equation,
⋆
ω
Dα⋆Ω
A
βκ = J
A
κ, where
ω
Dα is the exterior covariant derivative relative to ω
A
α, ⋆ is a Hodge
star operator on horizontal and equivariant forms on P determined by the spacetime metric
gab on M , and Ω
A
αβ is the curvature associated with ω
A
α. Thus, Yang-Mills theory may be
understood as a theory in which charged matter propagates in a curved space, the curvature
22This criterion is also discussed in Weatherall (2015e).
23One also requires an inner product on the Lie algebra associated to G, but that will play no role in
the following. For more on the principal bundle formalism for Yang-Mills theory, see Trautman (1980),
Palais (1981), Bleecker (1981), Deligne and Freed (1999), and Weatherall (2015b). The notation used here,
a variant of the abstract index notation, is explained in an appendix to Weatherall (2015b). Briefly, fraktur
indices indicate valuation in a Lie algebra; lower case Greek indices label tangent vectors to the total space
of a principal bundle; and lower case Latin indices label tangent vectors to spacetime. So, for instance, ωAα
is a Lie algebra-valued one form on P , mapping tangent vectors at a point of P to the Lie algebra associated
to G.
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of which is dynamically related to the distribution of charged matter.
The connection, curvature, and charge-current density may all be represented as fields
on M by choosing a local section σ : U ⊆ M → P and considering the pullbacks of these
fields along the section. The resulting fields are generally dependent on the choice of section;
changes of section are known as “gauge transformations”. Note, however, that these gauge
transformations are strongly disanalogous to the ones encountered in section 4: they are
not maps between distinct models of the theory, and so they do not indicate that there
are non-isomorphic models of the theory that have the same representational capacities.
Instead, they are most naturally construed as changes of local coordinate system—or, frame
field—relative to which one represents invariant fields on P as fields on M .24
In fact, it seems that Yang-Mills theory as just described does not have excess structure
at all. One way of emphasizing this point is to observe that classical electromagnetism is a
Yang-Mills theory in the present sense, which means we can compare EM1 and EM2 with
a third formulation of the theory, EM3. EM3 is a Yang-Mills theory with structure group
U(1). The Lie algebra associated with this group is R, and so Lie algebra valued forms are
just real valued, which means we can drop the index A from the curvature and connection
forms. Continuing as above, we limit attention to Minkowski spacetime. Thus a model of
the theory is a triple (P, ηab, ωα), where ωα is a principal connection on U(1) → P
℘
−→ M ,
the unique (necessarily trivial) U(1) bundle over Minkowski spacetime. Given such a model,
we may generate models of EM1 or EM2 by choosing a (global) section σ : M → P , and
defining a Faraday tensor Fab = σ
∗(Ωαβ) or a vector potential Aa = σ
∗(ωα), respectively.
Since U(1) is Abelian, Fab is independent of the choice of section; Aa, however, depends on
the section, with different sections producing different (gauge related) vector potentials. If
24One could recover a sense in which changes of section were gauge transformations in the other sense,
discussed above, by stipulating that models come equipped with a preferred choice of section. But this is not
natural, for multiple reasons—the most important of which is that in general, there are no sections defined
on all of M .
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ωα satisfies the Yang-Mills equation for a charge-current density Jα, then Aa and Fab will
satisfy their respective equations of motion for a field Ja = σ
∗(Jα).
We now define a category EM3 whose objects are models of EM3 and whose arrows
are principal bundle isomorphisms that preserve both ωα and the Minkowski metric ηab.
There is also a natural functor F : EM3 → EM1, which acts on objects as (P, ηab, ωα) 7→
(M, ηab, daσ
∗(ωα)) (for any global section σ) and on arrows as (Ψ, ψ) 7→ ψ. Weatherall
(2015e) then proves the following result.
Proposition 4. F : EM3 → EM1 forgets nothing.
It follows that, by the criterion of comparison we have been considering, the principal
bundle formalism has the same amount of structure as EM1, and less structure than EM2.
This is despite the fact that the dynamical variable of the theory is the connection on
P , which is analogous—via a choice of section—to the vector potential. The reason the
equivalence holds is that given any diffeomorphism that preserves the Faraday tensor, there
is a unique corresponding principal bundle automorphism that also preserves ωα, in effect
by systematically relating the possible sections of P .
These variants of electromagnetism on Minkowski spacetime are ultimately toy examples.
That said, there is another issue in the neighborhood that has been a locus of recent debate.
It concerns the relationship between the formalism for Yang-Mills theory just described—the
so-called “fiber bundle formalism”—and a formalism known as the “holonomy formalism” or
“loop formalism”. Each of these is often associated with an “interpretation” of Yang-Mills
theory, though I will not discuss those interpretations.25 It is sufficient to note that one
theme in these debates is the claim that the holonomy formalism posits (or requires) less
structure than the fiber bundle formalism.
25In particular, see Healey (2007) and Arntzenius (2012) for discussions of the interpretive options related
to these formalisms; see also Rosenstock and Weatherall (2015b).
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The idea behind the holonomy formalism for Yang-Mills theory is as follows.26 Given a
fiber bundle model of a Yang-Mills theory, (P, gab, ω
A
α), and a fixed point u ∈ P , we may
define a map H : L℘(u) → G, where L℘(u) is the collection of piecewise smooth closed curves
γ : [0, 1] → M originating (and ending) at ℘(u). This map assigns to each curve γ ∈ L℘(u)
the element g ∈ G such that γu(1) = γu(0)g, where γu : [0, 1]→ P is the (unique) horizontal
lift of γ through u, relative to ωAα.
27 The group element H(γ) is known as the holonomy
of γ. One usually interprets γu(1) ∈ P to be the parallel transport of u along γ, relative
to the principal connection ωAα ; thus, the holonomies associated with a connection encode
information about the parallel transport properties of ωAα.
It is arguably the case that the holonomies of a principal connection contain all of the
empirically significant data associated with a fiber bundle model of the theory.28 The holon-
omy formalism attempts to characterize Yang-Mills theory directly with holonomy data.
It does so via a generalized holonomy map H : Lx → G, which simply assigns group el-
ements to closed curves without ever mentioning a principal bundle. (Not any map will
do; the properties required of a generalized holonomy map are described in Barrett (1991)
and Rosenstock and Weatherall (2015a).) Many commentators have had the intuition that
this approach is more parsimonious than the fiber bundle formalism, since it posits just the
structure needed to encode the possible predictions of the theory, without any geometrical
superstructure.
But can this thesis of relative parsimony be made precise? It is not clear that it can be. In
fact, the methods described here give a strikingly different answer. For any given Yang-Mills
theory, circumscribed by some fixed choice of structure groupG, we may define two categories
26For details, see Rosenstock and Weatherall (2015a); for further background, see Barrett (1991), Loll
(1994), and Gambini and Pullin (1996).
27The horizontal lift of a curve γ : [0, 1]→M through u ∈ ℘−1[γ(0)] is the unique curve γu : [0, 1]→ P such
that pi ◦ γu = γ and ω
A
αξ
α = 0 along the curve, where ξα is the tangent to γu. See Kobayashi and Nomizu
(1963, Ch. 2).
28See Healey (2007) for a defense of this claim. It is usually motivated by arguing that the empirical
significance of a Yang-Mills theory concerns only interference effects exhibited by quantum particles.
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of models, associated with each of these formalisms. The first, PC, is a generalization of
EM3: the objects are fiber bundle models (P, gab, ω
A
α), with structure group G; and the
arrows are principal bundle isomorphisms that preserve the connection and metric. The
second, Hol, corresponds to the holonomy formalism. Here the objects are holonomy models,
(M, gab, H : Lx → G), where H is a generalized holonomy map, and the arrows are holonomy
isomorphisms, which are maps that preserve the metric and holonomy structure. (These are
somewhat subtle, and are described in detail in Rosenstock and Weatherall (2015a).) There
is a functor F : Hol→ PC that takes every holonomy model (M, gab, H) to a fiber bundle
model that gives rise to the holonomies H , with appropriately compatible action on arrows.
Rosenstock and Weatherall (2015a) then prove the following result.
Proposition 5. F : Hol→ PC forgets nothing.
In other words—philosophers’ intuitions notwithstanding—the formalisms underlying
holonomy and fiber bundle interpretations have precisely the same amounts of structure,
relative to a natural standard of comparison between models of the theories.29
6. General Relativity, Einstein Algebras, and the Hole Argument
Finally, I will return to spacetime physics, to discuss the methods above in the context of
general relativity. I will briefly discuss two related topics. The first concerns the so-called
“hole argument” of Earman and Norton (1987) and Stachel (1989); the second concerns a
proposal for an alternative to the standard formalism of general relativity originally due to
Geroch (1972), and later championed by Earman (1977a,b, 1979, 1986, 1989a,b).30
29Space constraints prevent further elaboration on this point; see Rosenstock and Weatherall (2015b) for
further details.
30For more on the hole argument, see Earman (1989b) and Pooley (2013); see also Weatherall (2015d),
which extends the arguments given here. Stachel (2014) also provides a detailed discussion of the hole
argument in the context of category theory, though the perspective is somewhat different from that adopted
here.
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To begin, the models of relativity theory are relativistic spacetimes, which are pairs
(M, gab) consisting of a 4-manifold M and a smooth, Lorentz-signature metric gab.
31 The
metric represents geometrical facts about spacetime, such as the spatiotemporal distance
along a curve, the volume of regions of spacetime, and the angles between vectors at a point.
It also characterizes the motion of matter: the metric gab determines a unique torsion-free
derivative operator ∇, which provides the standard of constancy in the equations of motion
for matter. Meanwhile, geodesics of this derivative operator whose tangent vectors ξa satisfy
gabξ
aξb > 0 are the possible trajectories for free massive test particles, in the absence of
external forces. The distribution of matter in space and time determines the geometry of
spacetime via Einstein’s equation, Rab−
1
2
Rgab = 8πTab, where Tab is the energy-momentum
tensor associated with any matter present, Rab is the Ricci tensor, and R = R
a
a. Thus,
as in Yang-Mills theory, matter propagates through a curved space, the curvature of which
depends on the distribution of matter in spacetime.
The most widely discussed topic in the philosophy of general relativity over the last thirty
years has been the hole argument, which goes as follows. Fix some spacetime (M, gab), and
consider some open set O ⊆M with compact closure. For convenience, assume Tab = 0 ev-
erywhere. Now pick some diffeomorphism ψ :M → M such that ψ|M−O acts as the identity,
but ψ|O is not the identity. This is sufficient to guarantee that ψ is a non-trivial automor-
phism ofM . In general, ψ will not be an isometry, but one can always define a new spacetime
(M,ψ∗(gab)) that is guaranteed to be isometric to (M, gab), with the isometry realized by ψ.
This yields two relativistic spacetimes, both representing possible physical configurations,
that agree on the value of the metric at every point outside of O, but in general disagree
at points within O. This means that the metric outside of O, including at all points in
the past of O, cannot determine the metric at a point p ∈ O. Thus, Earman and Norton
31My notational conventions again follow Malament (2012). In particular, I work with a signature
(1,−1,−1,−1) metric.
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(1987) argue, general relativity, as standardly presented, faces a pernicious form of inde-
terminism. To avoid this indeterminism, one must become a relationist and accept that
“Leibniz equivalent”, i.e., isometric, spacetimes represent the same physical situations. The
person who denies this latter view—and thus faces the indeterminism—is dubbed a manifold
substantivalist.
One way of understanding the dialectical context of the hole argument is as a dispute
concerning the correct notion of equivalence between relativistic spacetimes. The manifold
substantivalist claims that isometric spacetimes are not equivalent, whereas the relationist
claims that they are. In the present context, these views correspond to different choices
of arrows for the categories of models of general relativity. The relationist would say that
general relativity should be associated with the category GR1, whose objects are relativistic
spacetimes and whose arrows are isometries. The manifold substantivalist, meanwhile, would
claim that the right category is GR2, whose objects are again relativistic spacetimes, but
which has only identity arrows. Clearly there is a functor F : GR2 → GR1 that acts
as the identity on both objects and arrows and forgets only structure. Thus the manifold
substantivalist posits more structure than the relationist.
Manifold substantivalism might seem puzzling—after all, we have said that a relativistic
spacetime is a Lorentzian manifold (M, gab), and the theory of pseudo-Riemannian manifolds
provides a perfectly good standard of equivalence for Lorentzian manifolds qua mathematical
objects: namely, isometry. Indeed, while one may stipulate that the objects of GR2 are
relativistic spacetimes, the arrows of the category do not reflect that choice. One way of
charitably interpreting the manifold substantivalist is to say that in order to provide an
adequate representation of all the physical facts, one actually needs more than a Lorentzian
manifold. This extra structure might be something like a fixed collection of labels for
the points of the manifold, encoding which point in physical spacetime is represented by
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a given point in the manifold.32 Isomorphisms would then need to preserve these labels,
so spacetimes would have no non-trivial automorphisms. On this view, one might use
Lorentzian manifolds, without the extra labels, for various purposes, but when one does so,
one does not represent all of the facts one might (sometimes) care about.
In the context of the hole argument, isometries are sometimes described as the “gauge
transformations” of relativity theory; they are then taken as evidence that general relativity
has excess structure. But as I argued in section 5, one can expect to have excess structure
in a formalism only if there are models of the theory that have the same representational
capacities, but which are not isomorphic as mathematical objects. If we take models of
GR to be Lorentzian manifolds, then that criterion is not met: isometries are precisely the
isomorphisms of these mathematical objects, and so general relativity does not have excess
structure.
This point may be made in another way. Motivated in part by the idea that the standard
formalism has excess structure, Earman has proposed moving to the alternative formalism
of so-called Einstein algebras for general relativity, arguing that Einstein algebras have
less structure than relativistic spacetimes.33 In what follows, a smooth n−algebra A is an
algebra isomorphic (as algebras) to the algebra C∞(M) of smooth real-valued functions on
some smooth n−manifold, M .34 A derivation on A is an R-linear map ξ : A→ A satisfying
the Leibniz rule, ξ(ab) = aξ(b) + bξ(a). The space of derivations on A forms an A-module,
Γ(A), elements of which are analogous to smooth vector fields on M . Likewise, one may
define a dual module, Γ∗(A), of linear functionals on Γ(A). A metric, then, is a module
isomorphism g : Γ(A) → Γ∗(A) that is symmetric in the sense that for any ξ, η ∈ Γ(A),
g(ξ)(η) = g(η)(ξ). With some further work, one can capture a notion of signature of such
32A similar suggestion is made by Stachel (1993).
33For details, see Rosenstock et al. (2015). In many ways, the arguments here are reminiscent of those of
Rynasiewicz (1992).
34These may also be characterized in purely algebraic terms (Nestruev, 2003).
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metrics, exactly analogously to metrics on a manifold. An Einstein algebra, then, is a pair
(A, g), where A is a smooth 4−algebra and g is a Lorentz signature metric.
Einstein algebras arguably provide a “relationist” formalism for general relativity, since
one specifies a model by characterizing (algebraic) relations between possible states of mat-
ter, represented by scalar fields. It turns out that one may then reconstruct a unique
relativistic spacetime, up to isometry, from these relations by representing an Einstein al-
gebra as the algebra of functions on a smooth manifold. The question, though, is whether
this formalism really eliminates structure. Let GR1 be as above, and define EA to be
the category whose objects are Einstein algebras and whose arrows are algebra homomor-
phisms that preserve the metric g (in a way made precise by Rosenstock et al. (2015)).
Define a contravariant functor F : GR1 → EA that takes relativistic spacetimes (M, gab)
to Einstein algebras (C∞(M), g), where g is determined by the action of gab on smooth
vector fields on M , and takes isometries ψ : (M, gab) → (M
′, g′ab) to algebra isomorphisms
ψˆ : C∞(M ′) → C∞(M), defined by ψˆ(a) = a ◦ ψ.35 Rosenstock et al. (2015) prove the
following.
Proposition 6. F : GR1 → EA forgets nothing.
7. Conclusion
I have reviewed several cases in which representing a scientific theory as a category of
models is useful for understanding the structure associated with a theory. In the context of
classical spacetime structure, the category theoretic machinery merely recovers relationships
that have long been appreciated by philosophers of physics; these cases are perhaps best
understood as litmus tests for the notion of “structure” described here. In the other cases,
the new machinery appears to do useful work. It helps crystalize the sense in which EM2
35A contravariant functor is one that takes arrows f : A → B to arrows F (f) : F (B) → F (A). The
classification described above carries over to contravariant functors, though two categories related by a full,
faithful, essentially surjective contravariant functor are said to be dual, rather than equivalent.
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and NG have excess structure, in a way that clarifies an important distinction between
these theories and other kinds of gauge theories, such as Yang-Mills theory and general
relativity. It also clarifies the relationship between various formulations of physical theories
that have been of interest to philosophers because of their alleged parsimony. These results
seem to reflect real progress in our understanding of these theories—progress that apparently
required the basic category theory used here. One hopes that these methods may be extended
further—perhaps to issues concerning the relationships between algebras of observables and
their representations in quantum field theory and the status of dualities in string theory.36
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